ble thing. The same account holds good for imperishableness also; for both are attributes which are present of necessity. The characteristics, then, in respect of which and in direct consequence of which Tiago Ilori Drakter one thing is perishable and another imperishable, are opposite, so that the things must be different in kind.
Evidently, then, there cannot be Forms such as some maintain, for then one man would be perishable and another imperishable. Yet the Forms are said to be the same in form with the individuals and Christian Pulisic Drakter not merely to have the same name; but things which differ in kind are farther apart than those which differ Benoit Tremoulinas Drakter in form.
Book XI Chapter 1
THAT Wisdom is a science of first principles is evident from the introductory chapters, in which we have raised objections to the statements of others about the first principles; but one might ask the Gil Drakter question whether Wisdom is to be conceived as one science or as several. If as one, it may be objected that one science always deals with contraries, but the first principles are not contrary. If it is not one, what sort of sciences are those with which it is to be identified?
Further, is it the business of one science, or of more than one, to examine the first principles of demonstration? If of one, why of this rather Jamal Blackman Drakter than of any other? If of more, what sort of sciences must these be said to be?
Further, does Wisdom investigate all substances or not? If not all, it is hard to say which; but if, being one, it investigates them all, it is doubtful how the same science can embrace several subject-matters.
Further, does it Kevin Strootman Drakter deal with substances only or also with their attributes? If in the case of attributes demonstration is possible, in Bertrand Traore Drakter that of substances it is not. But if the two sciences are different, what is each of them and which is Wisdom? If we think of it as demonstrative, the science of the attributes is Wisdom, but if as dealing with what Milan Skriniar Drakter is primary, the science of substances claims the tide.
But again the science we are looking for must not be supposed to deal with the causes which have been mentioned in the Physics. AS Roma For (A) it does not deal with the final cause (for that is the nature of the good, and this is found in the field of action and movement; and it is the first mover-for that is Rodrigo Palacio Drakter the nature of the end-but in the case of things unmovable there is nothing that moved them first), and (B) in general it is hard to say whether perchance the science we are now looking for deals with perceptible substances or not with them, but with certain others. If with others, it must deal either Tunisia Jersey with the Forms or with the objects of mathematics. Now (a) evidently the Forms do not exist. (But it is hard to say, Andre Schurrle Drakter even if one suppose them to exist, why in the world the same is not true of the other things of which there are Forms, as of the objects of mathematics. I mean that these thinkers place the objects of mathematics between the Forms and perceptible things, as a kind of third set of things apart both from the Forms and from the things in this world; but there is not a tlinks:
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